Based on the idea of dense coding of three-photon entangled state and qubit transmission in blocks, we present a multiparty controlled quantum secret direct communication scheme by using Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state. In the present scheme, the sender transmits three bits of secret message to the receiver directly and the secret message can only be recovered by the receiver under the permission of all the controllers. All three-photon entangled states are used to transmit the secret message except those chosen for eavesdropping check and the present scheme has a high source capacity because Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state forms a large Hilbert space.
can be used in some special environments, which has been shown by Boströ em [9] and Deng et al. [10] . The works on QSDC attracted a great deal of attention and can be divided into two kinds, one utilizes single photon [11] [12] [13] , the other base on entangled state [9, 10, [14] [15] [16] [17] . Deng et al. [11] proposed a QSDC scheme by using batches of single photons which serves as quantum one-time pad cryptosystem. Cai et al. [12] presented a deterministic secure direct communication scheme using single qubit in a mixed state. We proposed a QSDC scheme based on the order rearrangement of single photons [13] . The QSDC scheme using entanglement state is certainly the mainstream. Boström and Felbinger [9] proposed a ''Ping-Pong'' protocol which is quasi-secure for secure direct communication if perfect quantum channel is used. Cai et al. [18, 19] pointed out that the ''Ping-Pong'' protocol is vulnerable to denial of service attack or joint horse attack with invisible photon. They also presented an improved protocol which doubled the capacity of the ''Ping-Pong'' protocol [14] . Deng et al. [10] put forward a two-step QSDC protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs. We presented a QSDC scheme using EPR pairs and teleportation [15] . Wang et al. [16, 17] proposed a QSDC scheme with quantum superdense coding and a multi-step QSDC scheme with a sequence of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger states.
In this paper, we present a multiparty controlled QSDC (MCQSDC) scheme by using GHZ state and its transformation. In present scheme, the sender's secret message is transmitted directly to the receiver and can only be reconstructed by the receiver with the help of all the controllers. Different from QSS, the sender transmits his/her secret message to the receiver directly and the information of the receiver is asymmetric to that of the controllers. Our scheme employs dense coding of three-photon entangled state proposed by Lee et al. [20] and qubit transmission in blocks [21] . Eight possible states of GHZ state which form a complete orthonormal basis carry three bits of information and all GHZ states are used to transmit the secret message except those chosen for eavesdropping check. We also discuss the security of the scheme.
For simplification, we first present our controlled QSDC scheme (CQSDC) with a controller by using three-photon GHZ states as the quantum information carries, and then generalize it to the case with many controllers.
A three-photon maximally entangled quantum system is in one of the eight GHZ states as follows:
where j0i and j1i are the two eigenvectors of the measuring basis (MB) Z, and
can be transformed into each other with one of the four unitary operations
performed on any two of the three-photons. If the initial state is jW 1 i, the transformation between the GHZ states is shown in Table 1 . In order to distinguish the sender's operations correctly in our scheme, we select eight two-photon operations {U 1 , U 2 , . . . ,U 8 } from sixteen operations, similar to that in Ref. [17] . Here
That is,
Now, let us describe the CQSDC scheme in detail. Suppose Alice is a divisional manager who wants to transmit her secret message directly to a assistant manager, Charlie, in a distant area. She also wants Charlie to recover her secret under the permission of the general manager, Bob. Alice and Bob trust each other. Alice cannot prepare entangled states. She can only perform computational basis measurement and the local unitary operation U k . The general manager, Bob, can prepare GHZ states and then establishes the quantum channel between Alice and Charlie. Thus our scheme works with the following steps: Table 1 The transformation of GHZ states by performing operations on twophotons Unitary operations on the first and the second photon jW 1 i r z r z or I I jW 2 i I r z or r z I jW 3 i ir y r z or r x I jW 4 i r x r z or ir y I jW 5 i I r x or r z ir y jW 6 i r z r x or I ir y jW 7 i r x r x or ir y ir y jW 8 i ir y r x or r x ir y (S1) All the parties of the communication agree that Bob prepares an ordered N three-photon states jWi ¼ 1 ffiffi 2 p ðj000i þ j111iÞ ABC . We denote the ordered N three-photon qubits with {[P 1 (A), P 1 (B), P 1 (C)], [P 2 (A), P 2 (B), P 2 (C)], . . . ,[P N (A), P N (B), P N (C)]}, where the subscript indicates the order of each three-photon in the sequence, and A, B, C represent the three-photons of each state. Bob takes one particle from each state to form an ordered partner photon sequence [P 1 (A), P 2 (A), . . . , P N (A)], called A sequence. The remaining partner photons compose B sequence, [P 1 (B), P 2 (B), . . . , P N (B)] and C sequence, [P 1 (C), P 2 (C), . . . , P N (C)]. Bob selects randomly one of the four unitary operations {I, r z , r x , ir y } and performs it on each of the photons in B sequence. He then sends A, B sequences to Alice and keeps C sequence.
(S2) After receiving A, B sequences, Alice selects randomly a sufficiently large subset from them for eavesdropping check.
The procedure of the eavesdropping check is as follows: When Alice performs Z-basis measurement on her photon and Bob performs I operation on the photon in B sequence, Bob's result should be j0i (j1i) if Alice's result is j0 0i (j1 1i). On the contrary, Bob's result should be j+i (jÀi) if Alice performs X-basis measurement on her photon and gets the result j+ +i or jÀ Ài(j+ Ài or jÀ +i). Then if Alice confirms that there is no eavesdropping, they continue to execute the next step. Otherwise, they abort the communication.
(S3) Bob chooses randomly one of the four unitary operations {I, r z , r x , ir y } and performs it on each of the photons in C sequence. He then sends C sequence to Charlie.
(S4) Alice and Charlie analyze the error rate of the transmission of C sequence. The method of eavesdropping check is similar to that of step (S2), but Bob should announce his operations on the selected photons in C sequence before Charlie publishes his measurement results. If the error rate is below the threshold they preset, they proceed to execute the next step. Otherwise they abort the communication.
(S5) Alice first selects randomly two sufficiently large subsets from A, B sequences for eavesdropping checks and then performs randomly one of the eight operations (S6) Thus Charlie owns A, B, C sequences. Without Bob's permission, Charlie cannot obtain Alice's secret message. Only after Bob publishes his operations on the photons in B, C sequences, could Charlie acquire Alice's secret message by performing GHZ basis measurement on each of the GHZ states. Now, let us discuss the security for the CQSDC scheme. The security requirement for the scheme is that Charlie can only recover Alice's secret with Bob's permission. The scheme is based on GHZ states and the security of the scheme is similar to those of the schemes using EPR pairs [10, 21] . The participators check the existence of eavesdropper during each transmission of the photon sequence. The security for the transmission of photons can be reduced to that of the BBM92 protocol [22] . The process for the transmission of A, B sequences from Bob to Alice is similar to that in Ref. [2] 
of C sequence in our scheme is similar to that of in Deng et al. two-step QSDC protocol [10] . The transmission of A, B sequences from Alice to Charlie is the same as that of the M sequence in their protocol. Similarly, Eve's attack affects the system as
The probe operator can be written as
Since b E is a unitary operation, the complex numbers a, b, a 0 and b 0 also satisfy b E b E y ¼ I. Eve's attack will introduce an error rate = 1 À jaj 2 = 1 À jb 0 j 2 . Here we do not consider Bob's operations on the photons in B sequence. The aim of Bob's operation is to prevent Charlie from acquiring partial secret message at the last step and it will not influence the security analysis here.
In a quantum system, accessible information is not more than the Holevo quantity vðqÞ ¼ SðqÞ À P i p i Sðq i Þ, where S(q) is the von-Neumann entropy of the state q and the upper bound of v(q) [23] . In our scheme, S(q) is bounded by the entropy of a diagonal density matrix q max with the diagonal entries jaj 2 ,
. The entropy of q max is
Here v(q) 6 S(q) 6 S(q max ). Therefore, the information that Eve can gain I Eve is bounded by S(q max ). Thus we have
where c = 1 À jaj 2 . Obviously, c is the detection probability. From this relation, it can be seen that when c = 0, i.e., Eve introduces no error during her eavesdropping, she will obtain no information for S(q max ) = 0. That is, any effective eavesdropping will result in a nonzero detective probability.
To explain the error rate introduced by Eve, we take an example for intercept-resend attack. In this attack, Eve intercepts the photons in A, B sequences and measures them in Z-basis, Bell basis or X-basis. She then resends the two-photon sequences to Alice after measurements. When Eve performs Z-basis measurement, the state of the whole system collapses to j0 0 0i or j1 1 1i each with probability 1/2. For example, the state collapses to j0 0 0i ABC and Eve resends j0 0i AB to Alice. During the eavesdropping check, if Alice performs Z-basis measurement, Eve's attack will not introduce any error. However, if Alice performs X-basis measurement, the state collapses to j+ + +i, j+ + Ài, j+ À +i, j+ À Ài, jÀ + +i, jÀ + Ài, jÀ À +i and jÀ À À i each with probability 1/8. According to the Eq. (1), the error rate introduced by Eve will achieve 50%. Thus the total error rate is 25%. Similarly, in this attack, if Eve performs Bell basis (X-basis) measurement, the error rate introduced by Eve will be 25% (37.5%). Thus the random Z-basis or X-basis measurement ensures that Eve's attack will be detected during the eavesdropping check.
Bob performs random unitary operations on B sequence before sending it to Alice, which prevents Charlie from acquiring partial secret message without the permission of Bob. Without Bob's operations, Charlie performs GHZ basis measurement on the photons in A, B, C sequences and can obtain partial information of Alice at step (S6) of the scheme. At step (S3), it is not necessary for the general manager to worry that Alice will acquire his operation information because we suppose Alice has no ability to perform GHZ basis measurement at the beginning. In the scheme, this problem is inessential because Alice and Bob are believable parties. Certainly, we can also solve the problem by adding random Hadamard transformation, which will be shown in the MCQSDC scheme. Because of the qubit correlation of each GHZ state, Eve's eavesdropping will be detected during the eavesdropping check. Charlie cannot obtain Alice's secret without Bob's permission because Bob performs random unitary operations on the photons in B, C sequences. Thus the present scheme is secure.
The above discussion is based on ideal case of noiseless quantum channel. In low noise quantum channel, Eve's attack will also be detected during the eavesdropping check because the photon loss is relatively small in this channel and the error rate or photon loss will increase as a result of eavesdropping. But if the loss of quantum channel is very high, Eve's eavesdropping will not be detected if she intercepts some transmitting photons in C sequence at step (S3) and sends the others to the receiver using a better quantum channel in which the photon loss will not increase. Eve has the chance to obtain partial secret message by performing GHZ basis measurement. Because of multi-step transmission, the security of the scheme is better than that of the two-step protocol in a high noisy channel. As discussed in Ref. [10] , quantum entanglement swapping and entanglement distillation can be used to ensure the parties that they share a sequence of GHZ states securely.
We then generalize the CQSDC scheme to a MCQSDC one. Suppose the divisional manager, Alice, wants to transmit her secret message directly to an assistant manager, Zach, who is in a distant area, but she wants Zach to recover her secret under the permission of the general manager Bob and the directors Charlie, Dick, . . . , York. Alice and all the controllers are honest parties. Alice cannot prepare entangled state. She can only perform computational basis measurement and unitary operation. The first two steps of the MCQSDC scheme are the same as those of the CQSDC scheme. We then describe the MCQSDC scheme from step (S3).
(S3 0 ) Bob chooses randomly the Hadamard operation
or the identity operation I. He also chooses randomly one of the four unitary operations {I, r z , r x , ir y }. Bob performs these two operations on each of the photons in C sequence and then sends C sequence photons to Charlie. (S4 0 ) After receiving C sequence, Charlie performs the similar operations as Bob and sends it to the next controller, Dick. Dick and the remaining controllers repeat the similar operations as Charlie until the receiver, Zach, receives C sequence. H operation is very important for the security of the scheme, which will be shown in the sequel.
(S5 0 ) After hearing from Zach, Alice selects randomly a sufficiently large subset from A, B sequences to check eavesdropping and then publishes the position of the sampling photons. She lets Zach measure the sampling photons in C sequence by using either Z-basis or X-basis and publish his measurement results. For each of the sampling photons, Alice selects randomly a controller to announce his/her operation information first and then the others in turn. When the number of H operation performed on each sampling photon in C sequence by the controllers is odd, Alice performs X-basis (Z-basis) measurement on her corresponding two-photons if she lets Zach measure the sampling photon in Z-basis (X-basis). On the contrary, when the number of H operation is even, Alice measures the corresponding photons in Z-basis (X-basis) if Zach performs Z-basis (X-basis) measurement. After doing these, Alice can determine the error rate of the transmission of C sequence. If she confirms there is no eavesdropping, the process is continued. Otherwise, the process is stopped.
(S6 0 ) Alice chooses the subsets of the sampling photons, encodes her secret message on A, B sequences and transmits the sequences to Zach step by step in the same way as step (S5) of the CQSDC scheme. The eavesdropping check for the transmission of B sequence is similar to that of step (S5 0 ). During the eavesdropping check for the transmission of A sequence, Alice first chooses randomly a controller to publish his/her operations performed on the sampling photons and then the others in turn. If the number of H operation is odd, Zach first performs H operation on each of the selected photons in C sequence and then measures each of the corresponding three-photon in GHZ basis. If the number of H operation is even, Zach performs GHZ basis measurement directly. Alice then lets Zach publish his measurement results. Thus Alice and Zach can estimate the error rate of the transmission of A sequence. Actually, Eve can only interrupt the transmission of A, B sequences and cannot steal any information.
(S7 0 ) If the controllers permit Zach to reconstruct Alice's secret message, they tell Zach their operation information. If the number of H operation is odd, Zach first performs H operation on the corresponding photon and then measures the corresponding three-photons in GHZ basis. If the number of H operation is even, Zach performs GHZ basis measurement directly. Thus Zach can obtain Alice's secret message under the permission of the controllers Bob, Charlie, . . . , York.
The security for the MCQSDC scheme is similar to that for the CQSDC scheme, but in the MCQSDC scheme it should ensure that each controller can really act as a controller. That is, the receiver Zach cannot recover Alice's secret if any controller disapproves his request. Moreover, the controllers' control information cannot leak to Eve. The H operations performed by the controllers can prevent Eve from obtaining the control information. The random choice of H operation and I operation is equivalent to the random choice of Z-basis and X-basis. Thus the transmission of C sequence is similar to that of the BB84 protocol [1] . The security of the transmission of C sequence is ensured by the uncertainty principle and quantum no-cloning theorem. When the participators perform only one of the four operations {I, r z , r x , ir y } on the C sequence and Eve intercepts the sequence, Eve then prepares a fake C sequence which belongs to one part of EPR pairs and sends it to the next participator, say Charlie. Eve can also intercepts the sequence on which Charlie performed his operations and then performs Bell basis measurement on the corresponding photons in the intercepted sequence and her other part of EPR pairs sequence. Thus Eve can acquire the operation information of the controller Charlie. In the scheme, all the controllers are creditable parties. As we have described above, Zach cannot obtain any controller's operation information. Moreover, during the eavesdropping check for the transmission of C sequence, Alice first lets Zach publish his measurement results and then the controllers announce their operation information. If Zach is dishonest, he intercepts C sequence which Bob sends to Charlie and resends a fake C sequence to Charlie. Alice will detect the error rate of the transmission of C sequence exceeds the threshold they preset during the eavesdropping check and then abort the communication. If any controller disapproves Zach's request, Zach is unable to acquire the controller's operation information and then cannot obtain Alice's secret. In the present scheme, only with the permission of all the controllers could Zach acquire the secret message.
So far we have presented a MCQSDC scheme based on dense coding of three-photon entangled state and qubit transmission in blocks. We first present a CQSDC scheme with a controller and then generalize it to a MCQSDC one. The sender encodes three bits of secret message on two-photons of each of the GHZ states and the receiver can reconstruct the sender's secret with the permission of all the controllers. It seems like a QSS scheme, but the sender's secret can be sent to the receiver directly and the information of the receiver is asymmetric to that of the controllers. We also analyzed the security of this scheme in the ideal case of noiseless quantum channel. In the present scheme, all of the GHZ states are used to transmit the secret except those used to check eavesdropping. The scheme has a high source capacity in that GHZ state forms a large Hilbert space. On the other hand, it requires the receiver to store the final GHZ states until all controllers provide their operation information in the MCQSDC scheme, which is a disadvantage for the scheme.
